People on the ground thus had no advance warning of the impromptu landing and little time to flee. Relive the incredible story of a pilot forced to glide an … That flight proceeded uneventfully with fuel gauges operating correctly on the single channel. After inconsistencies were found with the FQIS in other 767s, Boeing issued a service bulletin for the routine checking of this system. Before departure the engineer informed the pilot of the problem and confirmed that the tanks would have to be verified with a floatstick. Two factors helped avert disaster: the failure of the front landing gear to lock into position during the gravity drop, and the presence of a guardrail that had been installed along the centre of the repurposed runway to facilitate its use as a drag There were no serious injuries among the 61 passengers or the people on the ground. At the time of the incident, Canada was converting to the metric system. Air Canada Flight 143 was a Canadian scheduled domestic passenger flight between Montreal and Edmonton that ran out of fuel on July 23, 1983, at an altitude of 41,000 feet, midway through the flight. In the event of one failing the other could still operate alone, but under these circumstances the indicated quantity was required to be cross-checked against a floatstick measurement before departure. The outgoing pilot informed Captain Pearson and First Officer Quintal of the problem with the FQIS and passed along his mistaken belief that the aircraft had flown the previous day with this problem. (In previous times, this task would have been completed by a flight engineer, but the 767 was the first of a new generation of airliners that made this position redundant.) The calculation that they actually performed was: These were treated by a doctor who had been about to take off in an aircraft on Gimli's remaining runway.An Air Canada investigation concluded that the pilots and mechanics were at fault, although the Aviation Safety Board of Canada (predecessor of the modern Transportation Safety Board of Canada) found the airline at fault. As the gliding plane closed in on the decommissioned runway, the pilots noticed that there were two boys riding bicycles within 1,000 feet (300 m) of the projected point of impact. The engineer had encountered the same problem earlier in the month when this same aircraft had arrived from Toronto with an FQIS fault. The FQIS on the aircraft was a dual-processor channel, each independently calculating the fuel load and cross-checking with the other. Captain Pearson would later remark that the boys were so close that he could see the looks of sheer terror on their faces as they realized that a commercial airliner was bearing down on them. The plane also slammed into the guard rail now separating the strip, which helped slow it down.None of the 61 passengers was seriously hurt. To test the system he re-enabled the second channel, at which point the fuel gauges in the cockpit went blank. The unlocked nose wheel collapsed and was forced back into its well, causing the aircraft's nose to scrape along the ground.
This was the conversion factor provided on the refueller's paperwork and which had always been used for the rest of the airline's imperial-calibrated fleet. In the absence of any spares he simply repeated this temporary fix by pulling and tagging the circuit breaker. In a further misunderstanding, Captain Pearson believed that he was also being told that the FQIS had been completely unserviceable since then. On 22 July 1983, Air Canada's Boeing 767 (registration At 41,000 feet (12,500 m), over Red Lake, Ontario, the aircraft's cockpit warning system sounded, indicating a fuel pressure problem on the aircraft's left side.